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Post-crisis Exchange Rate Regimes in ASEAN: 
A New Empirical Test Based on Intra-daily Data
*
 




The purpose of this paper is to investigate what affected the post-crisis exchange rates of three 
ASEAN countries: Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia.  Our critical departure from previous 
studies is the use of intra-daily exchange rates.    The use of the intra-daily data is useful in removing 
possible estimation biases which the choice of numéraire may cause.    It can also contrast exchange 
rate movements during the time zone when the government intervention is active with those when 
the intervention is not active.  We examine how and when the ASEAN currencies changed their 
correlations with the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen.   We find significant structural breaks in the 
correlations during the time zone when East Asian market is open.  In the post-crisis period, the 
first structural break happened when Malaysia adopted the fixed exchange rate and the second break 
happened when some East Asian countries introduced inflation targeting.  The structural breaks 
suggest strong monetary and real linkages among the ASEAN countries. 
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 11. Introduction 
The analysis of implications of alternative exchange rate regime has been one of the most 
important questions in international economics.  In particular, an appropriate exchange rate regime 
for Asian countries has been a popular topic since the Asian currency crisis of 1997-98.  Most of 
the empirical discussion on exchange rate regimes has used the de jure regime as compiled by the 
IMF, which is based on the regime the country declares to be running.  However, many countries 
that adopt the de jure flexible rate intervene in foreign exchange markets so frequently.  Their 
observable performances thus have very little difference from those of countries that have explicit 
fixed exchange rates.
1  Conversely, frequent devaluations of pegs in inflation-prone countries are 
the result of the implementation of monetary and fiscal policies that are inconsistent with the fixed 
exchange rate.    Moreover, countries that appear to behave according to the declared regime during 
tranquil times may be tempted to change their course of action once the regime is under stress.  
Thus, a very different picture of exchange rate regime choices may appear once the international 
context becomes more volatile. 
In the pre-crisis period, it was widely documented that currencies of most East Asian economies 
maintained de facto pegs to the US dollar (see, for example, Frankel and Wei, 1994, Goldberg and 
Klein, 1997, and Ogawa, 2001).
2    One of the lessons from the Asian currency crisis of 1997-98 was, 
however, that the de facto dollar peg is an inappropriate exchange rate regime for a typical Asian 
emerging economy, which has a diversified set of trading partners, the US, Japan, EU, and 
neighboring Asian countries.  The real “effective” exchange rate of the typical Asian country 
frequently fluctuated as the third currencies—the yen and the European currencies—fluctuated 
vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar.    In particular, as the Japanese yen depreciated against the U.S. dollar from 
April 1995 to the summer of 1997, appreciation of the real effective exchange rates reduced the 
export competitiveness and increased current account deficits in the East Asian economies (see, for 
                                                  
1 Calvo and Reinhart (2002) found that many emerging market countries that say they allow their 
exchange rate to float mostly do not. 
2 Takagi (1999) is an exceptional study that found some significant correlations between the East 
Asian currencies and the Japanese yen during this period. 
 2example, Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini, 1999, and Ito, Ogawa, and Sasaki, 1998). 
In the post-crisis period, Hong Kong kept its currency board arrangement and the Chinese yuan 
virtually maintained its peg to the U.S. dollar.  However, most of the other East Asian economies 
have adopted managed float after the crisis.  Hernández and Montiel (2001) have suggested that 
they are now allowed to float more at low frequencies than before 1997-98.    Some other observers, 
in contrast, have argued that the so-called floating exchange regimes of the countries are not really 
floating when we look at high-frequency day-to-day observations (Kawai and Akiyama, 2000, 
McKinnon, 2001, McKinnon and Schnabl, 2004, and Fukuda, 2006).  In particular, using a 
regression framework developed by Frankel and Wei (1994), McKinnon asserts that the East Asian 
countries have fallen back to the soft dollar peg. 
The purpose of this paper is to extend the previous regression framework and to investigate what 
affected the post-crisis exchange rates of three ASEAN countries: Singapore, Thailand, and 
Malaysia.
3  Our critical departure from previous studies is the use of intra-daily exchange rates.  
Intra-daily exchange rates have widely been used in recent literature.    A limited number of studies, 
however, used them to explore exchange rate regimes.  The use of the intra-daily data is useful in 
removing possible estimation biases which the choice of numéraire may cause.    It can also contrast 
exchange rate movements during the time zone when the government intervention is active with 
those when the intervention is not active. 
Based on the intra-daily exchange rates, we examine how and when the ASEAN currencies 
changed their correlations with the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen.  During the time zone when 
the US market is open and when the East Asian market is closed, structural breaks were less clear 
throughout the post-crisis period.    We, however, find significant structural breaks in the correlations 
during the time zone when the East Asian market is open.  In the post-crisis period, the ASEAN 
currencies temporarily increased correlations with the Japanese yen.  The increased correlations 
were particularly conspicuous before September 1st 1998.  However, after Malaysia adopted the 
                                                  
3 Indonesia is another ASEAN country that has a strong regional linkage.    However, we did not 
analyze the Indonesia rupiah because of its prolonged turbulences after the crisis. 
 3fixed exchange rate, both the Singapore dollar and the Thai baht increased correlations with the U.S. 
dollar even during the time zone when the intervention is active.     
Except for Malaysia that started pegging to the U.S. dollar on September 1st 1998, the ASEAN 
countries had no institutional switch of exchange rate regimes in the post-crisis period.    It is thus far 
from clear why the ASEAN currencies increased their links to the U.S. dollar in the late 1990s.   A 
noteworthy implication from our empirical results is that a regime switch in an ASEAN country had 
an enormously large impact on the exchange rates of other ASEAN countries that had no regime 
switch.  This probably reflects the fact that economic linkages among the ASEAN countries are 
tight in monetary and real transactions.  A regime switch in a country had a strong impact on its 
neighboring economies and that the affected economies had another impacts on their neighboring 
economies.    Our empirical studies support this view and suggest that the exchange rate linkage was 
very important to see why the post-crisis ASEAN countries had a tendency reverting back to de facto 
pegs against the U.S. dollar. 
In recent literature, several studies proposed a new de facto classification of exchange rate regimes 
that reflects actual rather than announced policies, and constructed a de facto classification from 
IMF-reporting countries.  Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) defined exchange rate regimes 
according to the behavior of three classification variables: changes in the nominal exchange rate, the 
volatility of these variables, and the volatility of international reserves.    Reinhart and Rogoff (2003) 
constructed a de facto classification based on market-determined parallel exchange rates and 
inflation rates.  Their approaches are useful in identifying the de facto exchange rate regime in 
long-run.  However, the approach may not be useful in evaluating the post-crisis exchange rate 
regimes in East Asia where the regimes could have changed frequently during short-periods.    More 
importantly, the approach is not suitable for countries such as Singapore that adopt intermediate 
exchange regimes, particularly undisclosed basket pegs. 
Since East Asian countries have diversified trade structure, the currency needs to track the 
weighted average of the trading partners’ currencies in order to stabilize the real effective exchange 
 4rate.  Several economists have proposed the desirability of intermediate exchange rate regimes in 
East Asia that might stabilize their effective exchange rates (see, for example, Bénassy-Quéré, 1999, 
Williamson, 1999, 2000, Rajan, 2002).    In the post-crisis period, foreign reserves have increased in 
all Asian countries, proving that they have intervening, managing the pressure on the currency to 
appreciate.  It seems that increasing foreign reserves is an intended policy of many Asian central 
banks.    The regime of Asian currencies is thus more or less managed float.    However, it is far from 
clear whether they are more motivated by exchange rate stability, that is, “fear of float” a la Calvo 
and Reinhart (2002), or deliberate building up of the foreign exchange reserves, that is, the war chest 
for a battle against hedge funds.    It is thus very important to explore how and when the East Asian 
currencies changed their correlations with the U.S. dollar and the other major currencies. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 explains the method of estimations and the data. 
Section 3 theoretically explores how the choice of numéraire may affect the estimated coefficients.  
Section 4 investigates the timings of structural changes to determine alternative sub-sample periods.   
Sections 5 provides our estimation results and examines what impacts the regime switches in some 
ASEAN countries had on the post-crisis exchange regimes in the ASEAN countries.  Section 6 
examines how volatility of exchange rates changed in the post-crisis period.  After providing 
alternative interpretations in section 7, section 8 summarizes our main results and refers to their 
implications. 
 
2. The Estimation Method and Data 
In order to investigate the determinants of exchange rates in the ASEAN countries, we use an 
extended version of the method of Frankel-Wei to estimate the weights of major currencies (that is, 
the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen, and the Sterling pound) before and after the crisis.
 4  The 
Frankel-Wei method is a pioneering method to measure the weights of a basket that the currency of a 
developing country is explicitly or implicitly based.  In this approach, an independent currency is 
                                                  
4 One may use the Deutschmark or Euro for the Sterling pound.    The choice of the European 
currencies will not affect the essential results in the following analysis. 
 5chosen as an arbitrary numéraire for measuring the exchange variation.    The goal is to estimate the 
weight a currency assigns to another currency on a given frequency.  Suppose that X
j
t is the 
exchange rate of an ASEAN country j, where j = Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand.    Suppose also 
that USDt is the US dollar, JPYt is the Japanese yen, and SPt is the Sterling pound.  The estimated 





t = constant term + α1⋅∆USDt + α2⋅∆JPYt + α3⋅∆SPt, 
 
where ∆Et is the growth rate of the exchange rate Et.  A heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent covariance matrix is calculated by the method of Newey and West (1987).  As in the 
previous studies, the following analysis will use the Swiss franc as a numéraire.  The Swiss franc 
has a desirable property as a numéraire because it is widely transacted in international markets but 
has little linkage with the ASEAN currencies. 
Unlike previous studies, the data of each currency’s exchange rate is intra-daily data.  The data 
set was downloaded from Datastream.  Datastream provides several series of daily data in different 
foreign exchange markets, which allow us to obtain exchange rates in different times.  We 
downloaded daily data series from four alternative sources: noon in New York market from NY FED, 
6PM in New York market from GTIS, 10AM in Tokyo market from MUFG, and 5:30PM in 
Singapore market.  Combining these series, we constructed our series of intra-daily data.  As is 
summarized in Table 1, we classify time zones of each business day into the time zone when the US 
market is open but when both the East Asian and the European markets are closed [New York time 
12:00-18:00; Tokyo time 2:00-8:00; London Time 17:00-23:00], the time zone when the East Asian 
market is open but when both the US and the European markets are closed [New York time 
20:00-4:30; Tokyo time 10:00-18:30; London Time 1:00-9:30]
5, and others.  We then estimate 
                                                  
5 In case of Malaysia, the second time zone is New York time 19:00-4:30 (Tokyo time 9:00-18:30; 
London Time 0:00-9:30) for some period because the data from MUFG was available only after 
 6equation (1) for the first two time zones. 
The government usually intervenes in the foreign exchange market when the local market is open.   
This is particularly true for developing countries where most foreign exchange transactions of local 
currencies are limited to the local market.   The classification of the intra-daily data thus provides 
useful information that allows us to contrast exchange rate movements during the time zone when 
the government intervention is active with those during the time zone when the intervention is not 
active. 
 
3. The Choice of Numéraire and the Estimation Biases 
In our estimation, the currency value of each ASEAN country vis-à-vis the Swiss franc (CHF) is 
regressed on the yen-CHF, the US dollar-CHF, and the pound-CHF.  This coefficient gives the 
weights of a basket that the currency is explicitly or implicitly based.  The estimated coefficients 
are, however, subject to change depending on the choice of numéraire.  Based on a traditional 
monetary approach, this section explores how the choice of numéraire may affect the estimated 
coefficients in the Frankel-Wei method. 
Define the change in the log of country i’s nominal exchange rate in terms of country j’s currency 
by eij.    Denote the change in the log of country i’s money supply by ∆mi and the change in the log 
of country i’s non-monetary shock by ∆εi which is assumed to be independently identically 
distributed over time.    Then, the standard log-linear monetary approach implies that   
 
(2)   ∆eij = ∆mi – ∆mj + ∆εi - ∆εj, 
 
We suppose that country S’s currency is the numéraire currency and that country A’s and country 
J’s currencies are the major currencies on which currency i may put some basket weights.
6  T h e n ,  
                                                                                                                                                  
August 11, 1997.    When the data from MUFG is not available, we used 9am data in the Korean 
market. 
6 For simplicity, we reduced the number of the major currencies from three to two in the following 
discussions. 
 7assuming that all of countries S, A, and J keep their money supply constant under the flexible 
exchange rate (that is, ∆mS = ∆mA = ∆mJ = 0), equation (2) leads to the changes in the log of country 
i’s, country A’s, and country J’s exchange rates as follows 
 
(3a)   ∆ei,S = ∆mi + εi - εS, 
(3b)   ∆eA,S = εA - εS, 
(3c)   ∆eJ,S = εJ - εS. 
 
Therefore, when country i is a country the currency of which we need to measure the basket weights, 
the Frankel-Wei method suggests the estimation of the following equation: 
 
(4)   ∆ei,S = α ∆eA,S + β ∆eJ,S. 
 
The method then concludes that country i’s currency is fixed to country A’s currency if α = 1 and β = 
0, is independently floating if α = β = 0, and is in an intermediate regime if α and β lie between 0 
and 1. 
When country i’s de facto regime is the fixed exchange rate regime that pegs its currency to 
country A’s currency, it holds that ∆mi = εA - εi because ∆mi is adjusted so as to satisfy that ∆eiA = 0.   
By using (3a), (3b), and (3c), equation (4) is thus equivalent to estimating 
 
(5)  εA - εS = α (εA - εS) + β (εJ - εS). 
 
It is easy to see that the estimates of (5) by the ordinary least squares lead that α = 1 and β = 0.  
This indicates that the Frankel-Wei method can identify the regime correctly when country i’s 
currency adopts the fixed exchange regime. 
In contrast, when country i’s de facto regime is the flexible exchange rate regime that allows its 
 8currency independently floating, it holds that ∆mi = 0.    By using (3a), (3b), and (3c), equation (4) is 
then equivalent to estimating 
 
(6)  εi - εS = α (εA - εS) + β (εJ - εS). 
 
It is easy to show that the estimates of (6) by the ordinary least squares lead to     
 
 (7a)   α =  [ ]
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 ) ( / S J A J A S J σ σ σ σ σ σ σ + + , 
(7b)   β =  [ ]
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 ) ( / S J A J A S A σ σ σ σ σ σ σ + + , 
 
where σS
2 = E εS
2, σA
2 = E εA
2, and σJ
2 = E εJ
2.  In  general,  both  α and β lie between zero and one.   
This indicates that the Frankel-Wei method tends to misinterpret the pure flexible exchange regime 
as an intermediate regime.  A source of the biases is the country-specific shock in numéraire 
currency S.   In fact, if σS
2 = 0, (7a) and (7b) imply that α = β = 0, so that the Frankel-Wei method 
can identify the flexible exchange regime correctly. 
In the following analysis, we remove the possible estimation biases by using the intra-daily data.  
The basic idea is that we could identify the exchange rate regime correctly during the time zones 
when there is no country-specific shock in numéraire currency.    In our estimation, we use the Swiss 
franc as a numéraire.  The exchange rates denominated by the Swiss franc would thus show 
spurious correlations in equation (1) when there is an idiosyncratic shock on the Swiss franc.  The 
spurious correlations are more likely when European markets are open because news on the Swiss 
franc tends to be revealed during the time zone when the local market is open.  However, they are 
less likely when European markets are closed.  Our estimation could therefore identify the 
exchange rate regime more appropriately during two alternative time zones: (1) the time zone when 
the US market is open but when both the East Asian and the European markets are closed and (2) the 
time zone when the East Asian market is open but when both the US and the European markets are 
 9closed. 
 
4. The Alternative Sample Periods   
We estimate equation (1) for two alternative time zones in four alternative sample periods: (i) from 
January 7th 1997 to June 15th 1997, (ii) from February 2nd 1998 to the end of August 1998, (iii) 
from the September 2nd 1998 to December 29th 1999, and (iv) from January 4th 2000 to December 
30th 2002.    The period (i) is the pre-crisis period.    We chose this period in order to see whether the 
previous results during the pre-crisis period are still confirmed by our intra-daily data.  We break 
the post-crisis period into (ii), (iii), and (iv).  In the post-crisis period, two structural breaks are 
assumed to arise when Malaysia introduced the fixed exchange rate regime and when some ASEAN 
countries introduced inflation targeting. 
The first break is a natural choice because the Malaysian regime shift was the only drastic switch 
of the exchange rate regime in the post-crisis East Asian countries.  Before shifting to the fixed 
exchange rate regime, Malaysia was under managed float after the crisis.    In particular, since early 
1998, the Malaysian government had explored a new economic policy, including the stabilization 
policy of real effective exchange rates of the ringgit.
7  The introduction of the fixed exchange rate 
on September 1st 1998 was therefore a dramatic regime shift in Malaysia (see Figure 1).  In the 
following analysis, we start the estimation period of (ii) from the beginning of February 1998.    This 
is because except for the Indonesian Rupiah, most of the East Asian countries almost stabilized the 
exchange rates after the end of January 1998. 
The choice of the second structural break may be controversial.  However, the regime shift in 
monetary policy can affect the exchange rate policy.  In particular, when the share of imports in 
consumption goods is large, it is important to control exchange rates to achieve the inflation target.  
                                                  
7 For example, the National Economic Action Council (NEAC), which was established by Prime 
Minister Mahathir in December 1997, announced the National Economic Recovery Plan (NERP) in 
August 1998.    The plan stressed the importance of stabilizing the real “effective” exchange rates 
and proposed the adoption of a trade weighted basket system as a desirable exchange rate regime.   
The plan was based on the idea that the de facto pegs to the U.S. dollar sometimes destabilized the 
real “effective” exchange rates. 
 10Among ASEAN countries, Indonesia announced inflation targeting at the beginning of 2000 and so 
did Thailand in May 2000.  It is therefore highly possible that there was a structural break of 
monetary policy in Indonesia and Thailand in early 2000.     
In the following analysis, we investigate whether there were structural breaks in equation (1).    In 
particular, we explore the existence of structural changes not only in the country that had a regime 
shift in monetary policy but also in other countries that did not.    The motivation is to see whether a 
regime switch in an ASEAN country had a significant impact on the exchange rates of the other 
ASEAN countries that had no regime switch.  If economic linkages among the ASEAN countries 
are tight in monetary and real transactions, a regime switch in a country would have a strong impact 
on its neighboring economies and that the affected economies would have another impact on their 
neighboring economies.     
  Table 2 summarizes mean and standard deviation of the growth rate of each exchange rate for 
alternative time zones and sample periods.  All exchange rates are less volatile when only the US 
market is open [New York time 12:00-18:00] and are more volatile when only Sidney and Tokyo 
markets are open [Tokyo time 8:00-10:00].  The Japanese Yen and other East Asian currencies are 
more volatile when the East Asian market is open but when both the US and the European markets 
are closed [Tokyo time 10:00-18:30], while the Sterling Pound is more volatile when the European 
market is open [London Time 9:30-17:00].  Reflecting the crisis, East Asian currencies are more 
volatile from Feb. 2 to Aug. 31 in 1998.    However, all exchange rates are generally volatile enough 
for all time zones throughout the sample periods. 
 
5. The Estimation Results   
(i) From January 7th 1997 to June 15th 1997 
    Based on the intra-daily exchange rates, we first estimate equation (1) for the two alternative time 
zones from January 7th 1997 to June 15th 1997.  We made the estimations to see whether the 
previous results during the pre-crisis period are still confirmed by our intra-daily data.  Our 
 11estimations are different from previous studies not only in the sample period but also in the data 
frequency.  The results can thus be different from previous ones that were estimated based on less 
frequency data such as daily, weakly, or monthly data. 
Table 3 summarizes the estimation results.  In all of the ASEAN countries, the estimated 
coefficient of the US dollar was significantly positive and large.  In particular, it was close to one 
when the US market was open.  The estimated coefficients of the Japanese yen and the sterling 
pound were, in contrast, very small for both time zones in all of the ASEAN countries.    In Thailand 
and Malaysia, the coefficient of the Japanese yen was not significantly positive for any time zone.  
Even in Singapore, the U.S. dollar had the dominant weight in the currency basket of the Singapore 
dollar.  The results imply that the ASEAN currencies had strong links to the US dollar in the 
pre-crisis period. 
However, when the East Asian market was open, the links to the US dollar was not as strong as 
those when the US market was open.  When the East Asian market was open, the estimated 
coefficient of the US dollar was between 0.62 and 0.73.  In Malaysia, the sterling pound had 
significantly positive weights.  In Singapore, both the Japanese yen and the sterling pound had 
significantly positive weights.    The results imply that even in the pre-crisis period, the strong links 
of the ASEAN currencies to the US dollar does not necessarily mean de facto pegs to the US dollar 
during the time zone when the intervention is active. 
The adjusted R
2’s of the estimated equations were large in most estimates, implying that the 
degree of idiosyncratic flexibility was limited in the pre-crisis period.    The adjusted R
2 for the Thai 
baht was relatively low when the US market was open.    The result may reflect the fact that the Thai 
baht had several modest devaluations in the first half of 1997 before experiencing devastating 
currency attacks.     
 
(ii) From February 2nd 1998 to the end of August 1998 
We next estimate equation (1) for the two alternative time zones in the post-crisis period before the 
 12Malaysian government shifted its exchange rate regime from managed float to the fix exchange rate.   
After the Thai crisis in July 1997, several East Asian countries experienced serious currency 
devaluations.  During the crisis, the market values of the Malaysia ringgit and the Thai baht that 
had moved to managed float dropped to nearly half of the pre-crisis level until January 1998.  It 
was after the end of January 1998 when these currencies were almost stabilized.    We thus estimate 
equation (1) from February 2nd 1998 to the end of August 1998.
8
Table 4 summarizes the estimation results.  Compared with those in Table 3, the adjusted R
2’s 
dropped down dramatically in all of the ASEAN countries.  This implies that the ASEAN 
currencies increased their idiosyncratic flexibility after the crisis.  Compared with those in the 
pre-crisis period, the coefficient of the U.S. dollar declined, while that of the Japanese yen increased.   
The coefficient of the sterling pound became insignificant.  The estimated coefficients, however, 
showed different changes depending on the time zones, which contrast the exchange rate movements 
when the intervention is active with those when the intervention is not active. 
During the time zone when the US market is open and when the East Asian market is closed, the 
changes in the estimated parameters were relatively moderate in Singapore and Thailand.    In these 
countries, the coefficient of the US dollar remained high above that of the yen after the crisis.  In 
contrast, during the time zone when the East Asian market is open, there were drastic changes in the 
estimated parameters in all of the ASEAN countries.   The statistically significant coefficient of the 
Japanese yen lay between 0.62 and 0.78.    The coefficient of the U.S. dollar was, on the other hand, 
smaller than that of the Japanese yen in all of the ASEAN countries and was not significantly 
positive in Thailand and Malaysia.     
Table 5 summarizes the results of our structural break test.  Pooling the data from January 7th 
1997 to June 15th 1997 and from February 2nd 1998 to the end of August 1998, we tested the null 
hypothesis that each coefficient did not change after the crisis.    In the test, a heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation is adjusted by the method of Newey and West.    The table reports the changes of the 
                                                  
8 In case of Malaysia, we started the estimation from February 17th to exclude exchange rate 
turbulences in early February 1998.     
 13estimated coefficients between the regimes and their standard errors.  If there was no structural 
break, the change in each coefficient would not be significantly different from zero.  During the 
time zone when the US market is open, the test could find no significant structural break in Thailand 
although the test showed a structural break in Singapore.  In contrast, during the time zone when 
the East Asian market is open, the test showed significant structural breaks in all of the countries: a 
significant decline in the coefficient of the US dollar and a significant increase in the coefficient of 
the Japanese yen.    Among the three countries, the coefficient of the Japanese yen increased most in 
Malaysia after the crisis.     
The above results have three noteworthy implications.  The first is that a structural break 
occurred even in Singapore.  Compared with the other countries, Singapore experienced relatively 
modest currency devaluation during the crisis and consequently did not have an explicit shift of the 
exchange regime after the crisis.  Our results, however, suggest that regime switches in other East 
Asian countries had a large impact on the Singapore dollar that had no regime switch. 
The second is that the structural break was more conspicuous when the East Asian market was 
open.  To the extent that the government intervenes in the foreign exchange market when its local 
market is open, the impacts of the ASEAN government interventions would be reflected more in the 
changes of exchange rates when the East Asian market was open than those when the East Asian 
market was closed.  Contrasting our empirical results in the two time zones thus support the view 
that the interventions by the ASEAN governments increased the link of the East Asian currencies to 
the Japanese yen and decreased the link to the US dollar after the crisis. 
The third is that the most dramatic structural change occurred in Malaysia.  In Malaysia, the 
coefficient of the Japanese yen was significantly positive even when the US market was open, while 
that of the US dollar was not significant in both time zones.  The result probably reflects the fact 
that the Malaysian government explored a new economic policy, including the stabilization policy of 
real effective exchange rates before fixing the ringgit to the US dollar. 
 
 14(iii) From the September 2nd 1998 to December 29th 1999 
On September 1st 1998, the Malaysian government suddenly changed its exchange rate to the 
fixed exchange rate.    It was the only drastic switch of the exchange rate regime that occurred in the 
post-crisis East Asian countries.  In this sub-section, we estimate our basic equation after the 
Malaysian government shifted its exchange rate regime.  Since α1 = 1 and α2 = α3 =0 in Malaysia 
after September 1998, we estimated equation (1) only for Singapore and Thailand.    The motivation 
is to investigate how the dramatic regime shift in Malaysia affected the exchange rates of these 
ASEAN countries that had no explicit regime switch. 
Table 6 summarizes the estimation results.  During the time zone when the US market is open, 
the two ASEAN currencies kept having strong correlations with the U.S. dollar.    The coefficient of 
the U.S. dollar was close to one in both currencies, while the coefficient of the yen was not 
significant in the Thai baht.  Even in Singapore, the significant coefficient of the yen was very 
small.  In contrast, during the time zone when the East Asian market is open, the link to the U.S. 
dollar remained relatively moderate and the coefficients of the yen and the Sterling pound were still 
statistically different from zero in both countries.    However, the coefficient of the yen became much 
smaller than that of the U.S. dollar.  The coefficient of the U.S. dollar was statistically significant, 
although it was around 0.5.  Compared with those in Table 4, we can see that the adjusted R
2’s 
became larger after the regime shift in Malaysia.    This suggests that the ASEAN currencies reduced 
their idiosyncratic flexibility and increased correlations with the U.S. dollar after the regime shift. 
Table 7 reports the results of our structural break test after Malaysia introduced the fixed exchange 
rate regime.  Pooling the data from February 2nd 1998 to the end of August 1998 and from the 
September 2nd 1998 to December 29th 1999, we examined changes of the estimated coefficients 
between the regimes by Newey and West robust t-statistics.  During the time zone when the US 
market is open, the test showed a marginally significant structural break in Singapore but could find 
no significant break in Thailand after the Malaysian regime shift.    In contrast, during the time zone 
when the East Asian market is open, the test showed significant structural breaks in both Singapore 
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the coefficient of the Japanese yen. 
Comparing the results of two time zones suggest that the interventions by the ASEAN 
governments still kept some degree of links to the Japanese yen and the Sterling pound in their 
currencies in the sample period.    But even during the time zone when the intervention is active, the 
ASEAN currencies reduced the correlations with the Japanese yen and increased the correlations 
with the U.S. dollar after the regime shift in Malaysia.  This implies that the structural break in 
Malaysia had a large impact on the exchange rates of the other ASEAN countries that had no regime 
switch but whose economic linkages with Malaysia had been very tight.     
 
(iv) From January 4th 2000 to December 30th 2002.     
  The introduction of inflation targeting is in principle a regime shift of domestic monetary policy.  
However, in a small open economy where the share of imports in consumption goods is large, it can 
have a strong impact on the exchange rate policy.  This is because the import prices are a key 
determinant of targeted inflation in such an economy.  In particular, when the U.S. dollar has been 
dominant in invoice currencies in their imports, the introduction of inflation targeting might have 
increased their incentives to stabilize their exchange rates against the U.S. dollar.  For example, in 
the appendix of Inflation Report (July 2002), the Bank of Thailand showed a simulation result that 
10% depreciation of the Thai baht against the U.S. dollar would cause about 0.9% increase of core 
inflation rate.  It suggests that the exchange rate stability against the U.S. dollar is a critical factor 
to achieve the targeted inflation in Thailand. 
Inflation targeting was introduced in Indonesia and Thailand in early 2000.  We thus estimate 
equation (1) from January 4th 2000 to December 30th 2002 for two alternative time zones in 
Singapore and Thailand.  Table 8 summarizes the estimation results.  The adjusted R
2’s were 
larger than those in Table 6 and were almost comparable to those in the pre-crisis period in all 
countries.  The coefficient of the Sterling pound became less than 0.1 in both time zones.  When 
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introduced.    However, when the East Asian market was open, the coefficient of the US dollar went 
up to more than 0.6.  The results suggest that the government interventions increased further the 
links of the ASEAN currencies to the US dollar after early 2000 during the time zone when the 
intervention is active.  The coefficient of the Japanese yen was, however, significantly positive in 
both currencies for the two time zones.  The result is in marked contrast with that in the pre-crisis 
period where the Japanese yen had no significantly positive coefficient except for the East Asian 
time zone in Singapore.  This implies that the increased links to the U.S. dollar after early 2000 
were accompanied by some degree of flexibility where the Japanese yen had a significant weight. 
Table 9 reports the results of our structural break test after the introduction of inflation targeting.  
Newey and West robust t-statistics are applied for the structural beak test pooling the data from the 
September 2nd 1998 to December 29th 1999 and from January 4th 2000 to December 30th 2002.  
During the time zone when the US market is open, the test could find no structural break in both 
countries.  However, when the East Asian market was open, the coefficient of the US dollar went 
up significantly in Singapore.  It is noteworthy that the changes occurred even in Singapore that 
had no regime switch of monetary policy.    This implies the existence of a strong linkage among the 
ASEAN exchange rates.  However, the coefficient of the Japanese yen went up significantly in 
Thailand.  When intruding inflation targeting, the Thai baht increased its link to the Japanese yen 
significantly. 
 
6. Comparison of the Exchange Rate Volatility 
In the last section, we investigated how and when the ASEAN currencies changed their 
correlations with the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen.  Our basic finding was that the ASEAN 
currencies temporarily increased correlations with the Japanese yen after the crisis but that two 
structural breaks increased correlations with the U.S. dollar.  The high correlations with the U.S. 
dollar, however, did not necessarily mean that the ASEAN currencies have de facto pegs against the 
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some degree of flexibility and significant correlation with the Japanese yen both of which did not 
exist in the pre-crisis period. 
To support this view, this section explores how the structural breaks affected the volatility of 
exchange rates in the post-crisis period by using the daily data.    For the growth rate and the logged 
level, we calculate the standard errors of each ASEAN exchange rate against the U.S. dollar 
normalizing by its mean.  For the long-term data, the standard error of the logged exchange rates 
may be less desirable than those of the growth rates because the exchange rates usually have unit 
roots.  But the exchange rates sometime fluctuate around a constant par value in the short-run.  
The ratios of standard errors for the logged levels may thus be an alternative measure that provides 
some information of short-term volatility.    We assume the standard error of each ASEAN exchange 
rate in the pre-crisis period (that is, the standard error from January 7th 1997 to June 15th 1997) as 
the benchmark.  We then explore how the standard errors changed from the benchmark in three 
sample periods: (i) from February 2nd 1998 to the end of August 1998, (ii) from September 2nd 
1998 to December 29th 1999, and (iii) from January 4th 2000 to September  5th  2002.   
For each sub-sample period, Table 10-1 reports the ratios of the standard errors to the benchmark 
for the growth rates.    The results are consistent with the view that the ASEAN currencies increased 
correlations with the U.S. dollar after two structural breaks.  Comparing the ratios in the table, we 
see dramatic increases of the standard errors in the period (i).  The increases occurred partly 
because the ASEAN currencies still experienced some turbulence and partly because ASEAN 
currencies increased correlations with the Japanese yen.  The standard errors, however, declined 
steadily after September 1998.  In particular, in period (iii), the ratios became lower than one in 
Thailand and close to one in Singapore.    This implies that in terms of the growth rates, the ASEAN 
exchange rates after 2000 had stability against the U.S. dollar that is almost comparable to those in 
the pre-crisis period.     
Table 10-2 reports the ratios of standard errors to the benchmark for the logged level.    Except for 
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rate.  Comparing the ratios in the table, we see that the standard errors, which increased 
dramatically in the period (i), were partially stabilized in period (ii).    This suggests that the ASEAN 
exchange rates increased their link to the U.S. dollar in period (ii).  The standard errors, however, 
slightly increased in period (iii) in both Singapore and Thailand.  In terms of the levels, the 
Singapore dollar and the Thai baht increased their flexibility against the U.S. dollar after 2000.    The 
increased link to the U.S. dollar, that was observed in the growth rates, was accompanied by some 
degree of flexibility in the logged levels after 2000. 
 
7. Alternative Interpretations 
Until the last sections, we have demonstrated that the ASEAN currencies had changed their 
correlations with the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen in September 1998 and in early 2000.  We 
interpreted that the structural breaks arose when Malaysia introduced the fixed exchange rate regime 
and when some East Asian countries introduced inflation targeting.  However, several other 
interpretations may be possible. 
One interpretation is that a change of macroeconomic correlation altered the correlations of the 
ASEAN exchange rates with the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen.  Throughout the late 1990s, the 
U.S. economy was booming, while the Japanese economy experienced a long stagnation.    Since the 
ASEAN economies still stagnated in early 1998, their macroeconomic fundamentals had a strong 
positive correlation with those of Japan in the first half of 1998.  However, since the ASEAN 
countries made a sharp recovery after the middle of 1998, their fundamentals came to have a strong 
positive correlation with those of the United States after the latter half of 1998.  To the extent that 
macroeconomic fundamentals affect exchange rates, this may provide a partial explanation on the 
sources of the structural change in September 1998.  However, we see no conspicuous change in 
macroeconomic correlation in early 2000.  Moreover, the structural changes of the exchange rates 
had different features between two different time zones.  Structural changes of macroeconomic 
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The other interpretation is that a structural change of the Japanese yen/U.S. dollar exchange rate 
changed the correlations of the ASEAN exchange rates.  The Japanese yen/U.S. dollar exchange 
rate had series of structural breaks during the past decade.  Figure 2 draws the movements of the 
yen/dollar exchange rates from January 1994 to December 2001.    It shows that the yen had steadily 
depreciated against the U.S. dollar since the middle of 1995 and that the rate of depreciation was 
accelerated after November 1997.    The trend of the depreciation had continued until the end of July 
1998.    However, after August 1998, the yen, in turn, started appreciating against the U.S. dollar and 
that the appreciation had continued until the end of December 1999.  This indicates that if the 
ASEAN currencies had asymmetric responses to appreciation and depreciation of the yen/dollar 
exchange rates, they could have had different correlations with the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen 
before and after September 1998. 
The yen/dollar exchange rates, however, had a tendency to depreciate again after early 2000.  If 
the asymmetric responses to the yen/dollar exchange rates were important, the estimated correlations 
after early 2000 would have been reversed and became similar to those before September 1998 in the 
post-crisis period.  We, however, found that the estimated correlations never returned to those 
before September 1998.    Instead, the ASEAN currencies increased correlations with the U.S. dollar 
after early 2000.  The yen/dollar exchange rates are thus not satisfactory in explaining why large 
structural changes were observed in early 2000.   
 
8. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we investigated the determinants of the post-crisis exchange rates of three ASEAN 
countries: Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia.    Based on the intra-daily observations, we examined 
how and when the ASEAN currencies changed their correlations with the U.S. dollar and the 
Japanese yen.   A noteworthy implication from our empirical results was that a regime switch in an 
ASEAN country had an enormously large impact on the exchange rates of other ASEAN countries 
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countries are tight in monetary and real transactions.  A regime switch in an ASEAN country can 
have a strong impact on its neighboring economies and that the affected economies can have another 
impacts on their neighboring economies in ASEAN.    Our empirical studies supported this view and 
suggest that the exchange rate linkage was very important to see why the post-crisis ASEAN 
countries had a tendency reverting back to de facto pegs against the U.S. dollar. 
In recent literature, many economists based in the IMF and the US universities advocated the 
so-called “two-corner solution” (see, among others, Fischer, 2001).  According to the view, there 
are only two stable exchange rate regimes, free floating and hard peg such as the currency board and 
dollarization.  Any exchange rate regime between the hard peg and the free floating regime would 
be unstable and would eventually move to one of the extremes.    A supporting argument was the fact 
that Hong Kong and Argentina that had been adopting the dollar-peg, currency board survived the 
Mexican currency crisis of 1994-95 and the Asian currency crisis of 1997-98.    Other scholars were, 
however, more skeptical on the argument of the two-corner solution.  Critics argued that the 
middle-ground regime may be stable and that two corners may not be as robust as the two-corner 
solution advocates might think.    Frankel (1999) discussed that no single currency regime is right for 
all countries or at all times.    An appropriate exchange rate regime depends on economic conditions. 
Out of 186 economies, the IMF, as of December 31, 2001, classified 41 as independently floating, 
48 as following rigid pegs (exchange arrangements with no separate legal tender or currency board 
arrangements), and 35 as conventional pegs against a single currency fixed peg arrangements 
including de facto peg arrangements and pegged exchange rates within horizontal bands).  This, 
however, leaves 62 economies following intermediate regimes (pegs against a composite, crawling 
pegs, exchange rates within bands, and managed floating).  The implication is that many countries 
still choose something in between rigid fixity and free float.     
After the crisis, several ASEAN countries adopted different types of exchange rate regimes.  
After experiencing some transitional regime, Malaysia started pegging to the U.S. dollar on 
 21September 1st 1998, while Thailand and Indonesia adopted managed float since the crisis.  
Singapore kept the undisclosed basket peg.  Bayoumi, Eichengreen, and Mauro (2000, 2001) 
showed that on economic criteria, ASEAN appears less suited for a regional currency arrangement 
than Europe before the Maastricht Treaty, although the difference is not large.   However, the de 
facto pegs to the U.S. dollar may destabilize the real “effective” exchange rates of these currencies.   
The basket currency system that is advocated by Williamson (2000) is, to be precise, a basket band 
crawling system where the basket value is a reference rate.    The central bank is advised to keep the 
exchange rate fluctuation within a certain band around the reference rate.  The reference rate may 
move if the rates of inflation and the productivity increase are different from those of the trading 
partners.  To avoid another crisis in East Asia, it is an urgent issue to reconsider what is the 
desirable exchange rate regime in East Asian from a view of regional cooperation. 
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 25Table 1. The Classification of the Time Zones 
 
New York Time Tokyo Time London Time
(1) The Time Zone when the US Market is Open 12:00-18:00 2:00-8:00 17:00-23:00
but when the East Asian and the European Markets are Closed
(2) The Time Zone when the East Asian Market is Open 20:00-4:30 10:00-18:30 1:00-9:30
but the US and the European Markets are Closed
(3) The Other Time Zone I 4:30-12:00 18:30-2:00 9:30-17:00
The Other Time Zone II 18:00-20:00 8:00-10:00 23:00-1:00  
 
Note) In case of Malaysia, the time zone when the East Asian market is open starts from NY time 
19:00 (Tokyo time 9:00) because of data availability. 
 26Table 2.    Basic Statistic of Growth Rates of Exchange Rates 
 
















Jan. 7, 1997 - June.15, 1997 Mean 0.036% -0.054% -0.044% 0.062%
STD 0.331% 0.390% 0.522% 0.701%
Feb. 2, 1998 - Aug. 31, 1998 Mean 0.039% -0.016% -0.011% -0.012%
STD 0.206% 0.576% 0.647% 0.564%
Sep. 2, 1998 - Dec. 29, 1999 Mean 0.023% 0.002% -0.051% 0.027%
STD 0.325% 0.652% 0.622% 0.677%
Jan. 4, 2000 - Dec. 30, 2002 Mean 0.074% 0.048% -0.092% -0.031%
STD 0.315% 0.599% 0.422% 0.671%
















Jan. 7, 1997 - June.15, 1997 Mean 0.004% -0.173% 0.011% 0.157%
STD 0.276% 0.434% 0.417% 0.643%
Feb. 2, 1998 - Aug. 31, 1998 Mean 0.022% 0.035% 0.006% -0.063%
STD 0.317% 0.682% 0.692% 0.869%
Sep. 2, 1998 - Dec. 29, 1999 Mean 0.009% -0.111% -0.088% 0.190%
STD 0.392% 0.851% 0.664% 0.970%
Jan. 4, 2000 - Dec. 30, 2002 Mean 0.063% 0.002% -0.070% 0.005%
STD 0.317% 0.648% 0.478% 0.740%
















Jan. 7, 1997 - June.15, 1997 Mean 0.016% -0.007% -0.017% 0.008%
STD 0.305% 0.403% 0.514% 0.700%
Feb. 2, 1998 - Aug. 31, 1998 Mean 0.011% 0.021% -0.021% -0.012%
STD 0.222% 0.374% 0.418% 0.479%
Sep. 2, 1998 - Dec. 29, 1999 Mean -0.006% 0.040% -0.058% 0.024%
STD 0.258% 0.522% 0.513% 0.575%
Jan. 4, 2000 - Dec. 30, 2002 Mean 0.030% 0.037% -0.036% -0.031%
STD 0.263% 0.470% 0.381% 0.549%
Note STD = standard deviation.  
 27Table 2.    Basic Statistic of Exchange Rates (continued) 
 
















Jan. 7, 1997 - June.15, 1997 Mean 0.013% -0.034% -0.003% 0.024%
STD 0.318% 0.366% 0.479% 0.660%
Feb. 2, 1998 - Aug. 31, 1998 Mean -0.023% 0.085% -0.005% -0.056%
STD 0.364% 0.706% 0.706% 0.912%
Sep. 2, 1998 - Dec. 29, 1999 Mean 0.000% 0.014% -0.074% 0.060%
STD 0.342% 0.541% 0.489% 0.694%
Jan. 4, 2000 - Dec. 30, 2002 Mean 0.053% 0.052% -0.049% -0.056%
STD 0.325% 0.569% 0.409% 0.650%
















Jan. 7, 1997 - June.15, 1997 Mean -0.053% 0.108% 0.020% -0.061%
STD 0.351% 0.730% 0.522% 0.933%
Feb. 2, 1998 - Aug. 31, 1998 Mean -0.202% 0.262% 0.178% -0.238%
STD 0.491% 1.334% 0.905% 1.424%
Sep. 2, 1998 - Dec. 29, 1999 Mean -0.046% 0.087% 0.023% -0.063%
STD 0.462% 0.721% 0.630% 0.803%
Jan. 4, 2000 - Dec. 30, 2002 Mean 0.023% 0.176% -0.030% -0.169%
STD 0.360% 0.646% 0.460% 0.730%
















Jan. 7, 1997 - June.15, 1997 Mean 0.032% -0.041% -0.028% 0.037%
STD 0.324% 0.403% 0.474% 0.700%
Feb. 2, 1998 - Aug. 31, 1998 Mean -0.048% -0.031% 0.121% -0.124%
STD 0.423% 1.141% 0.983% 1.347%
Note STD = standard deviation.  
 
 28Table 3. The Estimation in the Pre-crisis Period (The Sample Period: Jan.7- June 15 in 1997) 
 
(1) The Time Zone when the US Market is Open
Singapore dollar Thai baht Malaysia ringgit
-0.0002 *** -0.0006 * 0.0000
(0.0001 ) (0.0003 ) (0.0001 )
0.9095 *** 1.0928 *** 0.9492 ***
(0.0001 ) (0.2080 ) (0.0340 )
0.0320 -0.1187 0.0061
(0.0293 ) (0.0981 ) (0.0022 )
0.0245 0.1400 * 0.0208
(0.0294 ) (0.0816 ) (0.0294 )
adj. R2 0.9494 0.6434 0.9619
DW 1.7037 1.2095 2.1666
(2) The Time Zone when the East Asian Market is Open
Singapore dollar Thai baht Malaysia ringgit
0.0003 0.0020 ** -0.0002
(0.0002 ) (0.0009 ) (0.0001 )
0.6207 *** 0.7212 *** 0.6395 ***
(0.0782 ) (0.1554 ) (0.0332 )
0.1526 *** 0.2691 0.0545
(0.0405 ) (0.2618 ) (0.0611 )
0.1662 ** 0.0889 0.2561 ***
(0.0665 ) (0.1376 ) (0.0719 )
adj. R2 0.7293 0.8598 0.7455











Notes 1) We added a dummy to remove irregular changes of Thai baht on May 16th 1997.
ɹɹ     2) ***: significant at 1% level, **: significant at 5% level, *: significant at 10% level.
          3) Figures in parentheses are standard errors of those coefficient estimates. 
 29Table 4. The Estimation before Malaysia Introduced the Fixed Exchange Regime   
(The Sample Period: Feb. 2 - Aug. 31 in 1998) 
 
(1) The Time Zone when the US Market is Open
Singapore dollar Thai baht Malaysia ringgit
-0.0005 * -0.0024 *** -0.0006 **
(0.0003 ) (0.0004 ) (0.0003 )
0.6351 *** 0.8902 *** 0.2258
(0.0971 ) (0.1982 ) (0.1979 )
0.2317 *** 0.0684 0.4500 ***
(0.0760 ) (0.1879 ) (0.0823 )
-0.0642 -0.2188 0.1434
(0.1530 ) (0.1554 ) (0.2236 )
adj. R2 0.2147 0.1187 0.1955
DW 1.5665 1.8619 1.9549
(2) The Time Zone when the East Asian Market is Open
Singapore dollar Thai baht Malaysia ringgit
0.0006 0.0024 *** -0.0006
(0.0004 ) (0.0009 ) (0.0008 )
0.2078 ** 0.1384 0.0680
(0.0989 ) (0.1245 ) (0.1642 )
0.6769 *** 0.6274 *** 0.7876 ***
(0.0589 ) (0.1327 ) (0.1277 )
0.0161 -0.0985 0.0829
(0.1274 ) (0.2195 ) (0.3288 )
adj. R2 0.5540 0.1289 0.1518
DW 2.0582 1.9984 2.4522
Notes 1) In case of Malayais, the estimation period starts from February 17th, 1998 to   
         exclude exchange rate turbulances in early February 1998.
ɹɹ     2) ***: significant at 1% level, **: significant at 5% level, *: significant at 10% level.










 30Table 5. The Structural Break Test Statistics After the Crisis 
 
(1) The Time Zone when the US Market is Open
Singapore dollar Thai baht Malaysia ringgit
Changes in the coeff. -0.2980 *** -0.3300 -0.7670 ***
of US dollar (0.0961) (0.2936) (0.1910)
Changes in the coeff. 0.203 ** 0.204 0.452 ***
of Japanese Yen (0.0806) (0.2184) (0.0862)
Changes in the coeff. -0.085 -0.342 * 0.134
of Sterling pound (0.1545) (0.1861) (0.2243)
(2) The Time Zone when the East Asian Market is Open
Singapore dollar Thai baht Malaysia ringgit
Changes in the coeff. -0.407 *** -0.634 *** -0.604 ***
of US dollar (0.1292) (0.2015) (0.1647)
Changes in the coeff. 0.516 *** 0.391 * 0.692 ***
of Japanese Yen (0.0753) (0.2366) (0.1323)
Changes in the coeff. -0.135 -0.159 -0.517 **
of Sterling pound (0.1394) (0.2698) (0.2220)
Notes 1) The data is from January 7th 1997 to June 15th 1997 and from February 2nd 1998 
         to the end of August 1998.  In Malayais, the latter period starts from February 17th, 1998.
ɹɹ     2) ***: significant at 1% level, **: significant at 5% level, *: significant at 10% level.
          3) Figures in parentheses are standard errors of those coefficient estimates.   
 31Table 6. The Estimation after Malaysia Introduced the Fixed Exchange Regime   
(The Sample Period: Sep. 2 in 1998 - Dec. 29 in 1999) 
 
(1) The Time Zone when the US Market is Open
Singapore dollar Thai baht
-0.0002 ** -0.0007 ***
(0.0001 ) (0.0002 )
0.8714 *** 0.9382 ***
(0.0695 ) (0.1171 )
0.1268 *** -0.0032
(0.0390 ) (0.0584 )
-0.0470 -0.0267
(0.0596 ) (0.0758 )
adj. R2 0.7770 0.4246
DW 1.8314 1.7114
(2) The Time Zone when the East Asian Market is Open
Singapore dollar Thai baht
0.0002 0.0009 ***
(0.0001 ) (0.0003 )
0.4630 *** 0.5237 ***
(0.0562 ) (0.0775 )
0.1663 *** 0.1152 ***
(0.0413 ) (0.0341 )
0.1982 *** 0.1836 **
(0.0679 ) (0.0927 )
adj. R2 0.5780 0.3552
DW 2.0382 1.9279
Note 1) ***: significant at 1% level, **: significant at 5% level, *: significant at 10% level.










 32Table 7. The Structural Break Test Statistics After Malaysia Introduced the Fixed Regime 
 
(1) The Time Zone when the US Market is Open
Singapore dollar Thai baht
Changes in the coeff. 0.266 ** 0.206
of US dollar (0.1143) (0.2250)
Changes in the coeff. -0.106 -0.075
of Japanese Yen (0.0850) (0.2039)
Changes in the coeff. 0.004 0.122
of Sterling pound (0.1584) (0.1860)
(2) The Time Zone when the East Asian Market is Open
Singapore dollar Thai baht
Changes in the coeff. 0.259 ** 0.398 ***
of US dollar (0.1170) (0.1539)
Changes in the coeff. -0.513 *** -0.519 ***
of Japanese Yen (0.0726) (0.1422)
Changes in the coeff. 0.172 0.250
of Sterling pound (0.1437) (0.2321)
Notes 1) The data is from February 2nd 1998 to the end of August 1998 and
           from the September 2nd 1998 to December 29th 1999.
ɹɹ     2) ***: significant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, *: significant at 10%.
          3) Figures in parentheses are standard errors.   
 33Table 8. The Estimation after the Introduction of Inflation Targeting   
(The Sample Period: Jan. 4 in 2000 - Dec. 30 in 2002) 
 
(1) The Time Zone when the US Market is Open
Singapore dollar Thai baht
-0.0002 *** -0.0005 ***
(0.0000 ) (0.0001 )
0.8085 *** 0.8677 ***
(0.0546 ) (0.0643 )
0.1631 *** 0.1116 **
(0.0383 ) (0.0485 )
0.0440 0.0942 **
(0.0374 ) (0.0374 )
adj. R2 0.8780 0.7875
DW 1.9007 1.9066
(2) The Time Zone when the East Asian Market is Open
Singapore dollar Thai baht
0.0002 ** 0.0014 ***
(0.0001 ) (0.0001 )
0.6534 *** 0.6361 ***
(0.0819 ) (0.0937 )
0.2380 *** 0.2529 ***
(0.0332 ) (0.0423 )
0.0743 0.0890
(0.0575 ) (0.0722 )
adj. R2 0.8501 0.6648
DW 1.9724 2.0687
Note 1) ***: significant at 1% level, **: significant at 5% level, *: significant at 10% level.











 34Table 9. The Structural Break Test Statistics After the Introduction of Inflation Targeting 
 
(1) The Time Zone when the US Market is Open
Singapore dollar Thai baht
Changes in the coeff. -0.061 -0.058
of US dollar (0.0872) (0.1402)
Changes in the coeff. 0.036 0.116
of Japanese Yen (0.0546) (0.0758)
Changes in the coeff. 0.090 0.112
of Sterling pound (0.0701) (0.0864)
(2) The Time Zone when the East Asian Market is Open
Singapore dollar Thai baht
Changes in the coeff. 0.190 * 0.115
of US dollar (0.0992) (0.1227)
Changes in the coeff. 0.071 0.128 **
of Japanese Yen (0.0529) (0.0536)
Changes in the coeff. -0.124 -0.085
of Sterling pound (0.0892) (0.1180)
Notes 1) The data is from the September 2nd 1998 to December 29th 1999 and
           from January 4th 2000 to December 30th 2002.
ɹɹ     2) ***: significant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, *: significant at 10%.
          3) Figures in parentheses are standard errors.   
 35Table 10-1. The Ratios of the Standard Errors to the Benchmark: The Case of Growth Rates 
 
(i) 1998.2.2-1998.8.31 (ii) 1998.9.2-1999.12.29 (iii) 2000.1.4-2002.12.30
Singapore 4.41578 2.13228 1.30648
Thai baht 2.83548 1.12223 0.72192
Malaysia 7.82866   
 
 
Table 10-2. The Ratios of the Standard Errors to the Benchmark: The Case of Logged Level   
 
(i) 1998.2.1-1998.8.31 (ii) 1998.9.1-1999.12.31 (iii) 2000.1.4-2002.12.31
Singapore 2.4662 1.27306 1.63465
Thai baht 2.3013 1.39702 2.27272
Malaysia 5.8750   
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Figure 2. Movements of the Yen/the U.S. Dollar Exchange Rate (Yen/$)
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